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TRUSTS
Decisions of the Ohio courts in the field of trusts reported during
1962 were devoid of landmark cases such as the 1961 decision of the
supreme court in the Smyth case.1 Interesting decisions were reported
pertaining to the investment powers and duties of a trustee, the interpre-
tation of language creating trusts, and the personal liability of trustees for
negligence causing injury to third persons.
TRUST INVESTMENTS
The most significant decision was that of the supreme court in Toledo
Trust Co. v. Toledo Hosp.2 The trust provisions expressly restricted
the investments of the trustee to federal and municipal government bonds.
No specific amount of income nor principal was required to be distrib-
uted to the beneficiaries, all of whom were charities. However, the use
of one-half of the corpus to build a hospital building was authorized. The
trustee argued that the inflation of the past twenty years had decreased
the dollar's purchasing power by fifty per cent and that carrying out
the testamentary authorization to build a hospital building would be
impeded unless deviation should be permitted. All the beneficiaries
joined in the prayer of the trustee's petition. The sole party opposing the
petition was the Attorney General of Ohio, who had been made a party
defendant as required by statute.3 The court held that it was not justified,
under the testator's strict language, and in the absence of an existing
emergency, in permitting the trustee to deviate because of inflationary
factors.4 It was noted that the restrictions on investments had served the
trust well during the 1930 depression and might prove equally wise in
the future.5 The opinion strongly implies that had the testator provided
that the charitable beneficiaries were to receive a specific sum, either in-
come or corpus, deviation might have been permitted in order to enable
1. Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
2. 174 Ohio St. 124 (1962).
3. OHIO REV. CODE § 109.25.
4. The court followed its rule enunciated in the second syllabus of Union Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Alter, 103 Ohio St. 188, 132 N.E. 834 (1921), which provides as follows:
"The controlling object in the construction of a will is the ascertainment and declaration
of the intention of the testator; and the changed value of money and property, the changed
circumstances and needs of the beneficiary, do not justify a court in modifying the provisions
of a will to meet the changed circumstances and conditions. The theory that the testator, had
he foreseen the changed circumstances and conditions, would have provided a different and
larger income is an assumption merely and is no excuse for the usurpation by the court of the
right to dispose of testator's property in a way different from that by him directed."
5. This observation seems particularly appropriate in view of the sharp stock market break
in the spring of 1962.
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the trustee to obtain for the beneficiaries the dollar purchasing power
the testator had specified they should have.6
In Vacha v. Vacha the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County construed
the investment provisions of a noncharitable testamentary trust. Under
the will, Blackacre was left to X in trust to hold, manage, lease, and care
for the property and collect the income therefrom all in accordance with
the trustee's best judgment and direction. The trustee was "also fully
authorized" to invest cash in the trust. The court was asked to determine
whether under such provisions the trustee was confined to legals' Fol-
lowing the Ohio Supreme Court's rule set forth in Home Savings & Loan
Co. v. Strain,' the court held that since the trustee was given discretion and
judgment in the matter of investing and, in addition, "was fully author-
ized" to invest cash, there was no intent to restrict the trustee to legals.' °
The duty imposed by statute" on a court appointed fiduciary of any
type (executor, administrator, trustee, or guardian) to place idle funds
in the trust at interest, is sometimes overlooked. In the case of Guardian-
ship of Sachs" the supreme court had occasion to refer to this rule.
While the case is not otherwise concerned with the law of trusts, it does
serve as a reminder of the fiduciary duty imposed by said statute, and the
principle on which it is based,'" to keep trust funds at work producing
income for the trust beneficiaries.
CREATION OF TRUSTS
Traditionally, courts have tried to construe liberally language which
seems to create a charitable trust. 4 This tradition was again demon-
strated in the decision of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in
In re Estate of Luce. 5 The testator left the residue of his estate to
X "to be expended by her for any charity or charities that she may
select and as a memorial to me."' 6  The court stated that no particular
form of words is needed to create a trust." Where the will shows the
6. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 167, comment c (1959).
7. 179 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
8. OHIO REV. CODE § 2109.37 as amended, OHIO REV. CODE § 2109.371.
9. 130 Ohio St. 53, 196 N.E. 770 (1935).
10. Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 7, 24 (1961).
11. OHIO REV. CODE § 2109.42.
12. 173 Ohio St. 270, 181 N.E.2d 464 (1962).
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),TRUSTs § 181, commentc (1959).
14. 9 OHIO JuI. 2D Charities § 5 (1954).
15. 116 Ohio App. 420, 185 N.E.2d 559 (1962).
16. Id. at 421, 185 N.X.2d at 560. The major question involved was whether the charitable
trust found to be created was exempt from Ohio inheritance taxes. It was held that the suc-
cession was not exempt under OHIO REv. CODE § 5731.21, because the testator did not limit
the charitable purposes to ones carried on in Ohio.
17. 41 OHIO JUR. Wills § 677 (1935).
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testator intended to charge the property bequeathed with a trust in favor
of third persons, effect will be given to the trust whether the words used
by the testator are dispositive, pre-emptory, or only precatory. More-
over, a charitable trust can be created even though, as here, no definitely
ascertainable beneficiaries are designated."8
Where an elderly testator having living issue desires to leave sub-
stantial interests for charities, it is recommended, 9 in setting up such per-
son's estate plan, that the gifts to charities be made through the use of an
inter vivos trust so as to avoid the operation of the mortmain statute.2"
Such a device was employed in Drew v. Richards,2 only in this case the
informality of the arrangement opened it to attack. Here the trustor, the
primary trustee, and one of the beneficiaries all were one and the same
person. However, the court found, contrary to the claims of the plaintiff
(a lineal descendant of the trustor), that the trust was not void under
the Statute of Frauds.m A question also arose as to whether there had
been an actual physical transfer of the assets to the trust. The court
found sufficient segregation of assets in the trustor's safe deposit box
to establish an acceptable corpus of the trust. The mortmain statute is
deeply imbedded in the law of Ohio. It has stoutly withstood numerous
efforts to change it.23 One would do well to be as formal and precise as
possible in creating any plan designed to circumvent it.
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Pomero?4 is concerned with the right of the
debtor-trustor to revoke a purported trust which he had created in the
1930 depression for the purpose of facilitating the orderly liquidation of
the trustor's nonliquid assets so that his creditors, who were made bene-
ficiaries of the trust, might be paid in full. The court found from its
analysis of the instrument and the fact that a transfer of legal tide of the
assets had been made to the trustee, that a valid trust had been created.
Interesting non-trust questions in the areas of novation and the right of
creditor beneficiaries to enforce their obligations otherwise barred by
the statute of limitations, are also discussed. When the trustor attempted
to revoke, his act clouded the future administration of the trust. The
trustee properly brought an action for instructions.25 The opinion points
18. Palmer v. Oiler, 102 Ohio St. 271, 131 N.E. 362 (1921). See REsTATEMENT (SEc-
oND), TRUSTS § 364 (1959).
19. Kohn, Drafting Techniques to Protect Charitable Trusts, 34 CLEW. BAR Ass'N. J. 21
(1962).
20. Ozio REv. CODE § 2107.06.
21. 177 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 1335.01.
23. Schwartz, The Ohio Mortmain Statute - A Need for Reform, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 576,
594 (1962).
24. 177 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
25. Cf. In re Estate of Ferris, 182 NX.2d 78 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
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